International reserves management and capital mobility in a volatile world by Aizenman Joshua et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES MANAGEMENT 
AND CAPITAL MOBILITY IN A VOLATILE WORLD:
POLICY CONSIDERATIONS AND A CASE STUDY OF KOREA
Joshua Aizenman
Yeonho Lee
Yeongseop Rhee
Working Paper 10534
http://www.nber.org/papers/w10534
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
June 2004
The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.
©2004 by Joshua Aizenman, Yeonho Lee, Yeongseop Rhee. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not
to exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including ©
notice, is given to the source. 
International Reserves Management and Capital Mobility in a Volatile World:
Policy Considerations and a Case Study of Korea
Joshua Aizenman, Yeonho Lee, Yeongseop Rhee
NBER Working Paper No. 10534
May 2004, Revised November 2005
JEL No. F15, F32, F36
ABSTRACT
This paper characterizes the precautionary demand for international reserves driven by the attempt
to reduce the incidence of costly output decline induced by sudden reversal of short-term capital
flows. It validates the main predictions of the precautionary approach by investigating changes in
the patterns of international reserves in Korea in the aftermath of the 1997-8 crisis. This crisis
provides an interesting case study, especially because of the rapid rise in Korea's financial
integration in the aftermath of the East-Asian crisis, where foreigners' shareholding has increased
to 40% of total Korean market capitalization. We show that the crisis led to structural change in the
hoarding of international reserves, and that the Korean monetary authority gives much greater
attention to a broader notion of 'hot money,' inclusive of short-term debt and foreigners'
shareholding.
Joshua Aizenman
Department of Economics
UCSC
1156 High Styreet
Santa Cruz, CA 95064
and NBER
jaizen@ucsc.edu 
Yeonho Lee
Economics Department 
Chungbuk National University
Korea
leeyh@chungbuk.ac.kr
Yeongseop Rhee
Economics Department 
Chungbuk National University
Korea
ysrhee@sookmyung.ac.kr
 2
 
1. Introduction 
 
The 1997-8 East Asian crisis has led to a rethinking of policy design in developing 
countries.  Several countries in East Asia have reacted by more active management of 
international reserves and external debt positions, and a large build up of international liquidity.   
These changes were triggered by the recognition that even the “Asian Tigers” were not immune 
to sudden stops of short-term capital flows.1  Countries averse to the costs of sudden stops of 
capital flows would tend to manage precautionary savings, in the form of international reserves.  
These reserves may provide a line of defense against sudden stops of capital flows.  Another 
intriguing adjustment of several countries (including Korea) has been growing financial 
openness coupled with greater flexibility of the exchange rate.  Figure 1 provides a vivid 
illustration of the remarkable opening of the Korean equity market in the aftermath of the 1997 
crisis, increasing foreigners’ equity position as a percentage of Korean GDP from close to 2% 
prior to the crisis to about 23 % within six years!  The greater flexibility of the exchange rate 
may provide a line of defense against sudden stops of capital flows.  However, the large share of 
foreign ownership of Korean stocks implies now that a sudden capital flow reversal exposes 
Korea to the risk of sharp real exchange depreciation coupled with the collapse of the Korean 
stock market.  In these circumstances, precautionary management of international reserves may 
mitigate these risks.   Such observations are consistent with Figures 1-2: in the aftermath of the 
crisis, the international reserves/GDP ratio increased sizably, reaching the ratio of the external 
debt/GDP.  Indeed, the increase in the international reserves/GDP ratio is positively correlated 
with the foreigners’ equity position in Korea as a share of Korean GDP. 
In this paper we provide theoretical and empirical interpretations for the build up and 
active management of international reserves.  In Section 2 we outline a model that may explain 
the patterns observed in Figures 1-2.  Specifically, we extend Aizenman and Marion (2004), to 
account for the possibility that sudden stops may trigger large output costs, due to higher cost of 
credit or banking crises.  In these circumstances, international reserves may reduce the 
probability of a full-blown liquidity crisis, thereby increasing welfare.  We find that exposure to 
sovereign risk and downside output risk associated with a costly debt crisis provides the rationale 
                                                 
1 See Calvo (1998) and Calvo and Mendoza (2000) for further discussion on sudden stops of 
short-term capital flows. 
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for precautionary savings and management of international reserves.  The hoarding of reserves 
associated with mitigating the expected output costs connected with sudden stops is shown to 
depend positively on the expected output cost associated with the liquidity squeeze.  The demand 
for reserves also increases with the effectiveness of international reserves in mitigating the 
probability of the crisis, and decreases with the opportunity costs of reserves.   
In section 3 we present an overview of key developments associated with the patterns of 
international reserves in Korea in recent years, and evaluate empirically the management of 
international reserves by the Korean Central Bank.  The evaluation is consistent with a structural 
brake in the patterns of hoarding and managing international reserves.  The timing of the brake is 
the 1997-8 Korean sudden stop crisis, which was associated with a sharp drop in output, and 
major policy adjustments in Korea.  The aftermath of the crisis has also been associated with 
rapid financial opening of Korea. As the Lucas Critique would suggest, we should expect that 
these events would lead to profound changes in the econometric association of variables, and 
structural brakes in the patterns of correlations among the various variables.  We confirm this 
prediction, finding significant structural changes in the patterns of international reserves in the 
aftermath of the 1997-8 crisis.  The shortness of the sample suggests that one should not expect 
stable results that would be robust across possible specifications, as indeed we find in our 
empirical results.  Yet, the data are consistent with the patterns depicted in Figure 2 --- the 1997-
8 crisis has led to a structural increase in the demand for international reserves, linking the actual 
level of IR with the exposure of liabilities to foreign creditors and equity holders.  
Specifically, our investigation shows that, while trade openness was significant in 
explaining international reserves before the crisis, it loses significance after the crisis.  This is 
consistent with the notion that the rapid integration of Korea with the global financial system 
increases the weight of financial openness, and may reduce the weight of trade openness, in 
accounting for the patterns of international reserves.  We also find that export receipts volatility 
was not significant before the crisis, but turns positive after the crisis. Higher foreigners’ 
shareholding is associated with higher hoarding of international reserves. Furthermore, this effect 
gains statistical significance after the crisis.  Of course, the large increase in the domestic 
exposure to foreigners’ shareholding in Korea implies that it plays a much more important role in 
accounting for the recent patterns of international reserves in the aftermath of the crisis.  
Coefficients on short-term external debt were negative and not significant before the crisis, but 
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turn positive and significant after the crisis.  This is consistent with the view that the crisis has 
led to a drastic change in attitude towards short-term debt, and a new policy that attempts to 
mitigate the exposure to hot money by increasing international reserves in tandem with short 
term debt and foreigners’ shareholding in Korea.  Volatility of the won/dollar exchange rate 
becomes significant after the crisis and exhibits negative coefficients, which is consistent with 
the theoretical prediction associated with allowing greater flexibility of the exchange rate.       
Section 4 closes the paper with discussion of the main finding and possible extensions. 
 
 
2. On the precautionary demand for international reserves 
The demand for international reserves stems from several sources.  The earlier literature 
focused on using international reserves as part of the management of an adjustable peg or 
managed floating exchange rate regime [Frenkel (1983), Edwards (1983); see Flood and Marion 
(2001) for a literature review].  The recent financial crises afflicting countries with limited access 
to international borrowing, suggest another aspect of international reserves – namely, they serve 
as an asset affecting the developing country’s exposure to sovereign risk and costly adjustment.  
These considerations suggest that international reserves may be viewed as a form of 
precautionary saving for economies with conditional access to global capital markets and costly 
domestic tax collection. Formally, both costly taxation, and imperfect integration with the global 
capital market due to sovereign risk generate nonlinearities that make precautionary balances 
welfare-improving.  Aizenman and Marion (2004) examine the contribution of reserves and 
external debt to tax smoothing for the case where future productivity is random, showing the 
welfare gain associated with hoarding a potentially large stockpile of international reserves.  It is 
noteworthy that sizable precautionary demand for international reserves exists even if agents are 
risk-neutral: the nonlinearities associated with costly taxation and sovereign risk suffices to 
induce a first order demand for reserves, independent of risk aversion. 
 In this section we extend the above argument to account for the possibility that sudden 
stops of short-term capital flows may trigger large output costs, due to higher cost of credit or 
banking crises.  In these circumstances, international reserves may reduce the probability of a 
full-blown liquidity crisis, thereby increasing welfare.  We outline below a simple model to 
account for this possibility.  The model is designed to capture an important feature of recent 
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crises: time consuming and costly debt renegotiation.  Even when the resolution of the debt crisis 
is reasonably fast, partial default and debt restructuring frequently leads to further short run 
declines in output, as was highlighted by Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992).  Unlike Aizenman and 
Marion (2004), where the distribution of output is independent of the default decisions, in this 
section we focus on the case where the default decision impacts the distribution of output, raising 
the possibility of costly recessions.  To simplify the discussion, we strip fiscal considerations 
from the problem, and identify the precautionary demand for international reserves that is 
independent of the inefficiencies associated with costly taxes. 
We study a two-period emerging-market economy where second period output, 2Y , is 
subject to productivity shocks. The country can borrow internationally in the first period, but 
because there is some chance it will default in the second period, it faces a credit ceiling.  The 
central bank actively targets the stock of reserves. Even so, a variety of exchange-rate 
arrangements are possible, such as a fixed exchange rate or a managed float, because the balance 
sheets of the central bank and treasury are consolidated.   The emerging market borrows B in 
period 1 at a contractual rate r  and owes (1+ r)B  in period 2.  If it faces a bad enough 
productivity shock in the second period, it defaults.  Default, however, is not without penalty.  
International creditors can confiscate some of the emerging market’s export revenues or other 
resources equal to a share α of its output.  The more open the economy, the greater α is likely to 
be.  We assume that the defaulting country’s international reserve holdings are beyond the reach 
of creditors.2  
In the second period, the country repays its international obligations if repayment, 
[ Br)1( + ], is less costly than the expected default penalty, assuming to be a fraction α of the 
expected output, ][ 2YEα .  The country ends up transferring S2 real resources to international 
creditors in the second period, where: 
 
(1)       [ ]2 2(1 ) ;S MIN r B Yα= +  ,                   10 << α . 
                                                 
2 This is a realistic assumption.  For example, on January 5, 2002, The Economist reported 
“[President Duhalde] confirmed that Argentina will formally default on its debt, an overdue 
admission of an inescapable reality.  The government has not had access to international credit 
(except from the IMF) since July.  It had already repatriated nearly all of its liquid foreign assets 
to avoid their seizure by creditors.” (The Economist, p. 29) 
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To simplify, we focus on a two states of nature example, where the second period 
exogenous productivity shock is either high (δ  ), or low ( δ− ).  We assume that all agents are 
risk neutral.  High enough external debt would lead to partial default in the bad state of nature.  
With probability p, the default would lead to a liquidity crunch or banking crisis, inducing a 
further drop of output at rate ε, from low level ( δ−1 ), to very low level [ )1)(1( εδ −− ].  The 
sequence of events is the following:  
I. In the first period the country borrows externally B , and hoards international reserves 
R.   
II. At the beginning of the second period, nature moves: the exogenous random output 
shock, δ  or - δ, is realized.   
III. Next, the decision maker moves, deciding whether to default or to repay fully.   
IV. A partial default decision would have further repercussions:  with probability p, it 
would magnify the output drop, reducing output from δ−1 to )1)(1( εδ −− . 
The reduced form of the GDP in period i (i = 1, 2) is: 
 
(2)  
1 1Y = ;   2
1 ; Pr 0.5
1
1 ; Pr 1
1 ; Pr 0.5
(1 )(1 ) ; Pr
III
IV
no default output remains
Y output remains p
default
output drops to p
δ
δ
δδ
δ ε
+⎧⎪ → −⎧⎪⎪ ⎪= − −⎧⎨ ⎪− ⎯⎯→⎨ ⎪⎪ ⎯⎯→⎨⎪⎪ ⎪⎪ − −⎪ ⎩⎩⎩
. 
The time line stages III and IV are pointed out above the corresponding arrows.   
Suppose the risk-free interest rate is rf .  The interest rate attached to the country’s 
acquired debt, r , is determined by the condition that the expected return on the debt is equal to 
the risk-free return: 
 
(3)          E[S2 ] = (1+ rf )B 
Applying the above assumptions, for debt level B and interest rate r, partial default would 
take place in the bad state of nature (at stage III of the time line stated above) if it raises the 
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expected consumption: )1)(1)(1()1)(1)(1()1(1 δεαδαδ −−−+−−−<+−− pprB , which is 
equivalent to   )1()]1()[1( rBp +<−+− αεαδ .3  Consequently, for 
)]1()[1()1()1( αεαδδα −+−>+>+ prB , the expected debt service is 
 
(4) [ ])1)(1()1()1()1(5.0][ 2 εδαδα −−+−−++= ppBrSE .  
 
The credit ceiling facing the economy, B , is the discounted expected repayment when the debt 
is large enough to induce partial default in all states of nature (discounting by the risk free 
interest rate, fr ):   
 
(5) [ ]
ff r
p
r
ppB +
−−=+
−−+−−++=
1
)]1(5.01[
1
)1)(1()1()1()1(5.0 δεαεδαδααδ . 
 
For exposition simplicity, we assume no independent fiscal objectives for the government, and 
zero initial debt and stock of reserves.  In a two-period model, there is no need to hold reserves 
beyond the second period.  Thus the terminal demand for reserves is zero.  Consequently, 
for )]1()[1()1()1( αεαδδα −+−>+>+ prB , the budget constraints facing the representative 
agents are:4 
 
                                                 
3 Partial default in the bad state of nature [following the output shock δ− ] changes the second 
period expected consumption cost of external debt form )1( rB + to )]1()[1( αεαδ −+− p .  The 
term )]1()[1( αεαδ −+− p  is the sum of the expected repayment to creditors [equals a fraction α 
of the expected output, )1)(1( εδα p−− ], plus the expected consumption loss associated with the 
adverse output effect of partial default [ εδ p)1( − ].  The first is a transfer to creditors, the second 
is the deadweight loss associated with partial default.  Note also that 
for (1 )[ (1 )] (1 )p B rδ α ε α− + − > + , the country is better off repaying the contractual debt. 
 
4 We assume lump sum taxes and transfers, and that the net income of the consolidated central 
bank and the treasury are rebated to the public. 
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where the vector of indexes (h, l, vl) corresponds to second period states characterized by (high, 
low, very low) consumptions, respectively.   The policy maker chooses the level of foreign debt 
and international reserves to acquire in the first period in order to maximize the representative 
consumer’s expected utility:  
 
(7) 
     RB
pCCpCCMAX vllh
,
])1([
1
5.0
,2,2,21 ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ +−+++ ρ  
 
where ρ  is the discount rate.    
Partial default on external debt may lead to further liquidity squeezes, as would be the 
case if it would induce some lenders to liquidate their portfolio, or if it would make it harder to 
obtain trade credit, etc.  We summarize the output effects of the liquidity squeeze in a reduced 
form, postulating that the probability p increases with the partial default in state l/international 
reserve ratio.  The resultant partial default, denoted by lΛ , is the gap between the contractual 
repayment and the actual planned repayment in state l: )1()1( δα −−+=Λ rBl .  Consequently, 
the probability that the partial default would trigger further output collapse is: 
 
 (8) .0';
00
0]
)1(
[
>
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⎪
⎩
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⎨
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Equation (8) is in line with Edwards (2004), finding that current account reversals associated 
with sudden stops have a negative effect on real growth that goes beyond their direct effect on 
investment, and that the probability of a country experiencing a current account reversal depends 
negatively on international reserves. It can be viewed as a reduced form of a more complex, three 
period model, akin to Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) liquidity model, where in the second 
period, a random fraction of foreign lenders attempts to liquidate their loan.   
The optimal borrowing and reserve accumulation is obtained by maximizing the expected 
utility (7), subject to (6) and (8).  It is easy to verify that borrowing would increase with the 
subjective discount rate, ρ.  For exposition simplicity, let us assume that the subjective discount 
rate is high enough to push the borrowing to the credit ceiling, BB = , given by (5).  This 
reduces the complexity of the problem, allowing us to focus on a single first order condition 
characterizing the optimal international reserve level corresponding to BB = .  Applying (6) to 
(7), we infer that  
 
 (9)      { }2, 2,dB 1 [ (1 )] dp1   (1 ) 0.5 | 0.5 |dR 1 dRf vl lB B B Bd B rr C CdRρ = =+⎡ ⎤− = + − + −⎢ ⎥+ ⎣ ⎦ .   
 
Note that when borrowing is at the credit ceiling (
BB =| ), the contractual repayment equals the 
default penalty in the best state of nature.  Hence, )1(|)1( δα +=+ = BBrB .  Thus, 
0|)]1([ =+ = BBdR
rBd .5  Applying this result to (9), it simplifies it to 
 
  (9’)  { }2, 2,dB 1 dp1   1 0.5 |dR 1 dRf l vlB Br C Cρ =⎡ ⎤− = + − −⎢ ⎥+ ⎣ ⎦  
 
                                                 
5 Note that )1(|)1( δα +=+ = BBrB  implies that
[ ] 0)1( =++
dR
drB
dR
Bdr , such that [ ]
0
|)1( =+ =
dR
rBd
BB .  The economic interpretation is that hoarding reserves reduces the 
probability of the “very bad” output associated with the default decision, hence it reduces the 
equilibrium interest rate, increasing the debt ceiling. 
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The LHS is the first period cost of a marginal unit of international reserve: the direct resource 
cost, minus the extra external borrowing induced by mitigating the credit ceiling.  The RHS is 
the expected second period discounted value of the marginal benefit associated with d R = 1. It is 
the sum of two terms: the first term evaluates the increase in second period purchasing power 
associated with the interest income, )1( fr+ .  The second term evaluates the gains associated 
with reducing the probability p (the probability that the partial default would induce further 
collapse of output), leading to a future expected gain of { }2, 2,dp0.5 |dR l vlB B C C=− −  [recall from 
(8) that dp 0
dR
< ].  Applying (6), (9’) is simplified to  
 
(9”)  1 dp dB(1 ) { | }0.5 (1 )(1 ) 1
1 dR dRf B B
r ε δ αρ =
⎡ ⎤+ − − − = −⎢ ⎥+ ⎣ ⎦  
 
Applying (5) and (8) to (9”) we infer that6 
 
 (10) ]
1
11[)1(5.0|R
ff rr
p
BB ++−−== αρηδε ;     
where 
Rr
d
pd
f
l
)1(
log
log
+
Λ=η  denotes the elasticity of the probability of p (output collapse) with 
respect to the partial default/international liquidity ratio. 
The hoarding of reserves depends positively on the expected output cost associated with 
the liquidity squeeze, p)1(5.0 δε − .  The demand for reserves also increases with effectiveness 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
6 Applying (5), it follows that 0
1
)]1(5.01[ =+
−−−
fr
pB δεα .  Applying (8) and the observation that 
αδδαδαδα 2)1()1()1()1(| =−−+=−−+=Λ = rBBBl , we infer that  ηR
p
dR
dp
BB
−==| .  
Applying the implicit function theorem and the above two equations, we infer 
ηδεαδεα
Rr
p
dR
dp
rdR
dB
ff
BBBB )1(
)1(5.0|
1
)1(5.0| +
−=+
−−= == .  Equation (10) is obtained by applying 
the last two equations to (9”), collecting and simplifying terms. 
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of international reserves in mitigating the probability of the crisis, as measured by the elasticity 
η.  The hording of reserves depends negatively on the opportunity costs of reserves, fr−ρ .   
Our analysis can be extended in several ways. It can be verified that similar results apply 
for an internal equilibrium, where borrowing is below the credit ceiling.  To simplify, we 
assumed that ε, the size of the endogenous output distress, is exogenously given.  The analysis 
can be readily extended by allowing both p and ε  to depend positively on our financial distress 
measure (i.e., on the partial default/international liquidity ratio).   
 Evaluation of the patterns of output in Korea (see Figures 6-7), as well the results 
reported in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Hutchison and Noy (2002) are consistent with the 
notion that sudden stops are associated with large output losses.  Hence, the 1997-8 crisis 
concentrated the minds of policy makers and economists on the potential hazards associated with 
exposure to sudden stops, and the potential benefits of hoarding international reserves. Figure 8 
reveals that the opportunity cost of hoarding international reserves has decreased significantly in 
the aftermath of the crisis.  These factual developments imply a sizable increase in the 
precautionary demand for international reserves by Korea.  We turn now to a more formal 
econometric assessment of these issues. 
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3. Management of International Reserves: Korea  
In this Section we evaluate empirically the management of international reserves by the 
Korean monetary authority.  We first illustrate what factors are behind the large accumulation of 
international reserves in the aftermath of the crisis by taking a look at the evolution of 
international reserves and other related macroeconomic variables.   
International reserves were 9 billion dollars (in terms of usable amount) at the end of 
1997, but rapidly built up to 155 billion dollars by the end of 2003.  As a fraction of GDP, 
international reserves rose from 3% to 30% over the same period.  A swift glance at the data 
indicates that a large current account surplus, coupled with continued inflows of foreigners’ 
equity investment, played an important role in the rapid accumulation of international reserves.  
Over the period 1998-2003, the cumulative current account surplus reached 103 billion dollars, 
and net portfolio inflows accumulated up to 56 billion dollars, among which 54 billion dollars 
were in the form of equity inflows (see Figure 3). Foreigners were allowed to directly purchase 
up to 10 % of the outstanding shares of a company in total, effective January 3, 1992.  The total 
ceiling was gradually raised to 26%, 50%, and 55% on November 3, December 11, and 
December 30, 1997 respectively. The ceiling was finally lifted completely on May 25, 1998.  In 
response to these liberalization policies, foreigners’ shareholding as a percentage of the total 
market capitalization has risen from 12% at the end of 1997, to 40% by the end of 2003 (see 
Figure 4). 
In order to assess the responsiveness of international reserves to those factors noted 
above, we run reduced-form regressions. These regressions relate change in international 
reserves to current account and net equity, debt, and other investment inflows in the balance of 
payments; and to changes in foreigners’ equity position and short-term external debt.  
Table 1(a) shows that current account and equity inflows are significant at the 1% level in 
the post-crisis period.  Specifically, a 1 dollar increase in the current account surplus led to a 0.75 
dollar increase in international reserves.  Further, after the crisis, a 1 dollar increase in equity 
inflows led to a 0.64 dollar increase in international reserves.  This finding confirms our prior 
conjecture that large current account surplus and equity inflows are the main driving forces 
behind the post-crisis build-up of international reserves. 
It is noteworthy that the 1997 crisis increased significantly the responsiveness of the 
international reserves position to external debts.  In Table 1(a) the coefficient on debt inflows 
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was negative in the pre-crisis period, though not significant.  However, it changes sign and gains 
significance at the 10% level in the post-crisis period, suggesting that debt inflows of 1 dollar led 
to an increase in international reserves by 0.5 dollar.  The results in Table 1(b) are consistent 
with this finding. For example, in Table 1(b), a 1% point increase in short-term debt/GDP ratio 
led to an increase of international reserves/GDP ratio by about 0.4% point before the crisis, and 
about 1.2% point after the crisis.  
One lesson to draw from the financial crisis is that the monetary authority should take 
into careful consideration capital flows, and relate the level of international reserves to short-
term external debt [for example, see Greenspan (1999) and Wijnholds and Kapteyn (2001)].7  In 
Korea, the short-term external debt/GDP ratio reached 20% at the end of 1997, fell to 11% at the 
end of 1998, and thereafter has remained stable around 10% (see Figure 2).  Throughout the pre-
crisis period, the international reserves/GDP ratio fell short of the ratio of short-term external 
debt to GDP.  However, it outpaced the short-term debt/GDP ratio in 1998:3Q for the first time, 
and thereafter continued to rise well above the short-term debt ratio.  Throughout this period, 
foreigners’ equity position/GDP ratio was 2% at the end of 1997, but sharply increased to 23% 
by the end of 2003.  This suggests that the large accumulation of international reserves may be 
related to the sharp increase in foreigners’ shareholding.  It is noteworthy that the ratio of 
international reserves to GDP tends to converge to the (short-term debt + foreigners’ 
shareholding)/GDP ratio (see Figure 5).8  This fact suggests that in the aftermath of the 1997-8 
                                                 
7 See Kim, Li, Rajan, Sula and Willett (2005) for a recent analysis judging reserve adequacy in 
Asia based on the behavior of different types of capital flows during currency crises. 
 
8  The Korean monetary authority unofficially maintains the view that international reserves 
should be enough to cover short-term external debt plus some portion of foreigners’ 
shareholdings:  
“Kim Woong-bae, director general of the central Bank of Korea (BOK), made clear that the 
Korean government would retain the current dollar stockpiles for the time being. “I don’t 
think the ample reserves will put pressures on monetary policy, including inflation, as the 
global economy is in a low-inflation era,” he said. Most of all, Korea needs to gear up for a 
sudden outflow of so-called hot money, he added. An estimate put the amount of speculative 
capital in the country’s stock and bond markets at $500 billion (Korea Times, 
http://times.hankooki.com, October 23, 2003).”  
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crisis, the Korean monetary authority gives much greater attention to a broader notion of hot 
money, inclusive of foreigners’ shareholding, rather than to short-term debt alone.9  
Using structural models, we now formally investigate whether equity inflows and short-
term external debt have played a significant role in the rapid accumulation of international 
reserves in the post-crisis period.  For this purpose, we start with a benchmark Regression (1) 
that adds foreigners’ equity position/GDP ratio and short-term external debt/GDP ratio to the 
traditional determinants of the demand for international reserves such as scale factor, trade 
openness, and volatility of exports:  
 
(11) ln(IR/GDP)t = a0 + a1 ln(RGDP) t  + a2 ln(API) t  + a3 ln(SDEX) t  + 
      a4 ln(FEP/GDP) t  + a5 ln(SED/GDP) t,                       
 
where IR is international reserves, RGDP is real GDP, API is the share of imports of goods and 
services in GDP, SDEX is the volatility of export receipts, FEP is foreigners’ shareholding, and 
SED is short-term external debt.10 
Regressions (2) – (5) in Table 2 add, respectively, contemporaneous and lagged current 
account (CA), log of the deviation of the real effective exchange rate from its equilibrium value 
(LDEVREER), and log of the volatility of the won/dollar exchange rate (LSDWON), to the 
explanatory variables employed in Regression (1).  In Regressions (6) and (7) all explanatory 
variables are included, the former with contemporaneous current account and the latter with 
lagged current account.  
These specifications are adopted to allow for the possible effects of structural changes in 
Korean economy on international reserves that developed in the aftermath of the 1997 crisis.  
The current account is added to capture the policy response to changes in the status of Korea’s 
current account.  Over the period 1990-1997, Korea recorded current account deficits that 
amounted to 58 billion dollars in total. In sharp contrast, however, starting in 1998 the current 
                                                 
9 Notice that in Table 1(b) the ratio of foreigners’ equity position to GDP gains significance at 
5% after the crisis. 
 
10 Total external debt/GDP and short-term external debt/total external debt ratios are also 
considered. However, they turn out to be insignificant and are not reported. 
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account deficit turned into a surplus and remains in surplus to the present day.  Over the period 
1998-2003, Korea accumulated a current account surplus of 103 billion dollars.  When the 
current account is in surplus, a central bank is inclined to purchase foreign exchanges to mitigate 
appreciation pressure on the national currency.  
Asian countries are often blamed for manipulating their exchange rates to maintain 
international competitiveness.  The Korean monetary authority may have intervened in the 
foreign exchange market to prevent real appreciation of the won.  To explore this possibility we 
consider the deviation of the real effective exchange rate from its equilibrium. 
As of December 16, 1997, Korea has adopted a floating exchange rate regime and allows 
the won to float.  Theoretically, a free-floating exchange rate regime reduces the demand for 
international reserves, but practically it may increase the demand because of  ‘fear of floating’.  
The monetary authority may need more international reserves to stabilize the exchange rate in 
the face of rapidly growing foreign exchange transactions and increasingly volatile exchange 
rate.  In order to empirically assess the relative importance of the two conflicting effects, we 
include the volatility of the won/dollar exchange rate.  
Table 2 presents regression results, both for the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods.  The 
data set begins from 1992:1Q, when direct purchases of the Korean stocks were first allowed to 
foreigners, and ends in 2003:4Q.  We split the whole sample into two subsets:  1992:1Q-
1997:2Q and 1998:3Q-2003:4Q in order to investigate whether there are significant structural 
changes in the patterns of international reserves after the 1997 crisis.  The time spans before and 
after the crisis are well balanced, each period covering 5 years and 2 quarters.  We exclude 
1997:3Q-1998:2Q from the estimation, during which Korean financial markets were 
experiencing extraordinary turbulence due to the ongoing Asian financial crisis.   
As shown in Regression (1), real GDP does not appear to play any important role, both 
before and after the crisis.  It is statistically significant only in Regression (4) in the post-crisis 
period, but not significant in all other cases.11  Trade openness was significant before the crisis, 
but loses its significance after the crisis in Regression (1).  The same result obtains in 
Regressions (3) and (4).  The volatility of export receipts was not significant before the crisis, but 
                                                 
11 This result is not surprising, considering that the dependent variable is already deflated by 
GDP. Dropping real GDP from the explanatory variables does not alter the major results of the 
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becomes significant after the crisis in Regressions (1), (2), (3), and (4).  These findings suggest 
that Korea is more concerned about the uncertainty than the magnitude of export receipts in the 
post-crisis period, during which current account is in continued surplus. 
The result, that foreigners’ shareholding leads to an increase in international reserves, is 
more significant in the post-crisis period.  The ratio of foreigners’ shareholding to GDP is 
significant both before and after the crisis in Regressions (1), (2), and (4).  On the other hand, in 
Regressions (5) – (7) foreigners’ equity position is not significant before the crisis, but becomes 
statistically significant after the crisis. 
An interesting finding is that prior to the crisis the coefficient on short-term external debt 
is negative, though not significant in most cases, but after the crisis it turns to a positive value 
and becomes significant.  The results are robust across all the other Regressions (2) – (7).  This 
finding indicates that short term external debt was considered a substitute for international 
reserves before the crisis.  International transactions can be financed by external debt, thereby 
reducing the demand for international reserves (Eaton and Gersovitz, 1980).  The 1997 financial 
crisis, however, has dramatically changed the attitude towards short-term debt, as indicated by 
the Korean government’s attempts to mitigate the exposure to hot money by changing 
international reserves in tandem with short term debt.  This is consistent with the notion 
elaborated in the previous section: the crisis has led to a large increase in precautionary demand 
for international reserves. 
The current account, either contemporaneous or lagged, does not exhibit any significant 
effect on international reserves in both periods.  The signs of its coefficient differ, depending on 
model specifications (specifically, contemporaneous or lagged).  As discussed above, a current 
account surplus tends to increase international reserves via foreign exchange market bank 
intervention on the supply side, but at the same time it may decrease the demand for international 
reserves by reducing the perceived vulnerability of a country to external shocks. 
Exchange rate deviation from its equilibrium value is significant in Regression (4), both 
before and after the crisis. It has a positive coefficient before the crisis, implying that 
overvaluation of the won led to an increase in international reserves.  This may be due to 
purchases of foreign exchanges by the central bank in an effort to prevent appreciation of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
paper, and in most regressions increases the level of statistical significance of foreigners equity 
position and short-term debt in the post-crisis period.  
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won.  After the crisis, however, its sign becomes negative as shown in Regression (4).  Note that 
in the post-crisis period the exchange rate deviation is also significant at the 5% level in 
regression (6), where current account and the volatility of exchange rate are included, but its sign 
is still negative.12 
This puzzling result may be due to the lack of a reliable measure of the equilibrium 
exchange rate or change in exchange rate policies after the crisis.  Korea introduced inflation 
targeting in 1998, devoting more attention to stabilizing the price level than to preventing real 
appreciation of the won.  Appreciation of the won contributes much to a fall in the inflation rate 
by lowering the costs of imported materials and final goods.  The Korean monetary authority, 
therefore, has less incentive to prevent appreciation of the won under inflation targeting.  
Consistent with the theoretical prediction, in the aftermath of the crisis, the exchange rate 
volatility coefficient is negative and becomes significant at the 1% level in Regressions (5) and 
(7) under the flexible exchange rate regime.   
 
4. Concluding remarks  
 One interpretation of the recent hoarding of international reserves by East Asian countries 
is as a result of precautionary demands.  Our discussion suggests that the precautionary demand 
depends positively on the ability of international reserves to mitigate the probability of output 
collapse induced by sovereign partial default, and the ability of international reserves to alleviate 
shortages of fiscal resources in bad states of nature.  While the data reviewed in Section 3 is 
consistent with this interpretation, we do not argue that the present level of international reserves 
observed in East Asia is optimal.  Some of the demand for international reserves is driven by 
factors beyond the scope of this paper.  These may include reserve accumulation triggered by 
concerns about export competitiveness, an explanation advanced recently by Dooley, Folkerts-
Landau and Garber (2003).  Short of having better data and more detailed econometric 
investigations, the precautionary motive and the mercantilist interpretations for hoarding 
international reserves may be observationally equivalent.  Yet, the two interpretations are 
associated with different welfare effects.  Another difference between the two approaches is that 
                                                 
12 This finding, together with the lack of statistical significance of the current account coefficient, 
is in contrast with the popular view that Asian countries manage exchange rates to preserve 
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the precautionary demand identifies an “optimal” stock of international reserves, whereas the 
Dooley at al. (2003) approach views the level of international reserves as a residual, and does not 
attempt to identify its optimal size.  Testing and identifying the differential impact of 
precautionary versus mercantilist motives on international reserves remains a task for future 
research.   
 
  
                                                                                                                                                             
export competitiveness. Of course, addressing this issue in depth requires not only accurate 
measures of foreign exchange market intervention, but also more formal models.  
 19
Data Appendix 
 
IR  international reserves minus gold. 
CA  current account balance.  
EQIN  net equity inflows in the balance of payments. 
DEBTIN net debt inflows in the balance of payments. 
OIIN other investment inflows in the balance of payments, including loans, trade credits, 
and currency and deposits. 
FEP  foreigners’ equity position based on market value of shareholding. 
Source: Financial Supervisory Service of Korea, http://www.fss.or.kr. 
SED  short-term external debt. 
LRGDP real GDP, logged. 
LAPI the percentage share of imports of goods and services in GDP, logged.   
LSDEX volatility of exports. Volatility is calculated using the previous 12 quarters data 
and is the standard deviation of annual growth rates of export receipts, logged. 
LFEPY the ratio of foreigners’ equity position to GDP, logged.  
LSEDY the ratio of short-term external debt to GDP, logged.  
CA(-1) current account balance, lagged one period. 
LDEVREER deviation of the real effective exchange rate from equilibrium, logged. A rise in 
the real effective exchange rate indicates a real appreciation of the won. Two 
measures of equilibrium exchange rate are considered. One is calculated by the 
HP filter, and the other by average rates of the actual real effective exchange rate 
in the two sub-periods.  
Source: JP Morgan, http://www2.jpmorgan.com/MarketDatalnd/Forex for the 
data of the real effective exchange rate. 
LSDWON volatility of the exchange rate, logged. Volatility is calculated using the previous 
24 months of data and is the standard deviation of monthly percentage changes in 
the won/dollar exchange rate.  
 
 
All data are from Bank of Korea, http://www.bok.or.kr, unless otherwise indicated. 
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Table 1. Reduced Form Equations 
 
(a) Dependent variable: D(IR) 
 1992:1-1997:4 1998:1-2003:4 
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
CA 0.4177* 1.80 0.7482*** 5.14 
EQIN 1.7106*** 4.15 0.6424*** 3.17 
DEBTIN -0.2509 -0.65 0.5077* 1.79 
OIIN 0.7040*** 4.22 0.6863*** 4.17 
C -2165.7*** -3.04 1826.8*** 2.27 
Adjusted R2 0.5898 0.6509 
DW 1.3591 2.2107 
Notes: D(IR) is change in international reserves (IR), CA is current account surplus, EQIN is net equity inflows, 
DEBTIN is net debt inflows, and OIIN is other investment inflows (loans, trade credits, and currency and deposits) 
in BOP. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. Zivot and 
Andrews (1992) unit root tests that allow for a single structural break in the intercept, the trend or both reveal that all 
explanatory variables are stationary around segmented intercept, and intercept and trend that occurred in 1997:3Q or 
1997:4Q. 
 
 
(b) Dependent variable: D(IR/GDP) 
 1994:4-1997:3 1998:3-2003:4 
Variable Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
CA/GDP 0.6965* 1.85 0.6934*** 2.84 
D(FEP/GDP) 0.3526 1.44 0.1292** 2.26 
D(SED/GDP) 0.3747** 2.94 1.2202*** 7.80 
C 0.3624 1.35 0.1424 0.57 
Adjusted R2 0.6827 0.8551 
DW 1.9063 2.6081 
Notes: D(IR/GDP) is change in the ratio of international reserves (IR) to GDP, CA is current account surplus, FEP is 
foreigners’ equity position, and SED is short term external debt. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 2. Determinants of Reserve Holding 
   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Variable Before After Before After Before After Before After 
LRGDP 0.6008 
(1.25) 
0.4830 
(1.19) 
0.5134 
(0.91) 
0.5117 
(1.12) 
1.1735 
(1.56) 
0.5151 
(1.21) 
0.4123 
(1.23) 
0.6621* 
(1.84) 
LAPI 0.6304* 
(2.00) 
0.1218 
(0.32) 
1.4075 
(1.34) 
0.1123 
(0.29) 
2.3971* 
(2.12) 
0.0780 
(0.19) 
1.6449** 
(2.93) 
0.4896 
(1.36) 
LSDEX 0.0087 
(0.07) 
 0.3708*** 
(2.83) 
0.0130 
(0.10) 
0.3565**
(2.16) 
-0.0190 
(-0.16) 
0.3940**
(2.60) 
-0.0816 
(-0.94) 
0.2424* 
(1.93) 
LFEPY  0.5126*** 
(3.38) 
0.1338* 
(1.97) 
0.5037**
(3.05) 
 0.1296*
(1.72) 
0.5485**
(3.50) 
0.1567 
(1.60) 
0.3619** 
(3.08) 
0.1488**
(2.50) 
LSEDY -0.3184 
(-1.12) 
0.8301** 
(2.27) 
-0.2679 
(-0.81) 
0.8372**
(2.20) 
-0.4986 
(-1.47) 
0.8947**
(2.12) 
-0.3875* 
(-1.97) 
0.9035***
(2.83) 
CA - - -0.0036 (-0.39) 
-0.0017 
(-0.15) - - - - 
CA(-1) - - - - 0.0125 (0.98) 
0.0051 
(0.34) - - 
LDEVREER - - - - - - 1.6386
** 
(2.78) 
-1.3067**
(-2.47) 
LSDWON - - - - - - - - 
C -10.6419 
(-1.41) 
-6.31291 
(-1.27) 
-8.9965 
(-0.98) 
-6.5768 
(-1.21) 
-19.3888
(-1.66) 
-6.8165 
(-1.28) 
-8.0207 
(-1.53) 
-9.6344**
(-2.12) 
Adjusted R2 0.6905 0.8562 0.6397 0.8469 0.6888 0.8478 0.8541 0.8911 
DW 2.2838 1.4308 2.3751 1.4146 2.8091 1.3997 3.2883 2.3212 
 
 (5) (6) (7) 
Variable Before After Before After Before After 
LRGDP 0.1260 
(0.23) 
-0.0783 
(-0.35) 
0.5222 
(0.80) 
0.7384 
(1.72) 
0.1028 
(0.13) 
-0.1450 
(-0.54) 
LAPI 0.9484 
(1.06) 
0.5869** 
(2.87) 
1.8924 
(1.81) 
0.3304 
(0.66) 
1.4880 
(1.38) 
0.4805* 
(2.08) 
LSDEX -0.0528 
(-0.45) 
0.0280 
(0.33) 
-0.0848 
(-0.66) 
0.1266 
(0.60) 
-0.0740 
(-0.73) 
0.0555 
(0.60) 
LFEPY 0.3304 
(1.74) 
0.0925** 
(2.61) 
0.3805 
(1.53) 
0.1364* 
(2.03) 
0.3623 
(2.08) 
0.1167**
(2.31) 
LSEDY -0.0656 
(-0.21) 
0.4105* 
(2.08) 
-0.4735 
(-1.03) 
0.9688**
(2.77) 
-0.4847 
(-1.33) 
0.4351* 
(1.85) 
CA - - 0.0017 (0.13) 
-0.0057 
(-0.57) - - 
CA(-1) - - - - -0.0125 (-0.80) 
0.0074 
(0.93) 
LDEVREER - - 1.8854 (1.28) 
-1.3481**
(-2.38) 
2.9714 
(1.80) 
0.3461 
(0.77) 
LSDWON 0.0499 
(1.42) 
-0.1209*** 
(-6.77) 
-0.0101 
(-0.11) 
-0.0508 
(-0.44) 
-0.0435 
(-0.76) 
-0.1349***
(-5.30) 
C -2.9530 
(-0.33) 
0.5562 
(0.20) 
-9.9762 
(-0.97) 
-9.6964 
(-1.71) 
-3.8852 
(-0.33) 
1.5109 
(0.43) 
Adjusted R2 0.7353 0.9622 0.7684 0.8795 0.8077 0.9602 
DW 2.8124 2.1079 3.2386 2.3099 3.1172 2.0565 
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the international reserves/GDP ratio.  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.   
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<Figure 1> International Reserves and Foreigners’ Equity Position  
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Notes: IR is international reserves, and FEP is foreigners’ equity position based on market value of foreigners’ 
shareholdings. The correlation between the two ratios is +0.44 before the crisis (1992:1Q-1997:3Q), but increases to 
+0.79 after the crisis (1998:2Q-2003:4Q). 
 
 
<Figure 2> International Reserves and External Debts  
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Note: IR is international reserves, SED is short-term external debt, and TED is total external debt. 
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<Figure 3 > International Reserves and Balance of Payments 
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Note: CCA is cumulative current account surplus, CEQIN is cumulative equity inflows, and CDEBTIN is 
cumulative debt inflows in the balance of payments. All variables accumulated since 1998. 
 
 
 
<Figure 4> Foreigners’ Shareholding 
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Note: Foreigners’ shareholding as a percentage of the total market capitalization has risen from 12.4% at the end of 
1997 to 40.1% by the end of 2003. 
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<Figure 5> International Reserves and FEP+SED 
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Note: The correlation between the two ratios is +0.40 before the crisis (1994:4Q-1997:3Q), but increases to +0.81 
after the crisis (1998:2Q-2003:4Q). 
 
 
 
<Figure 6> Real GDP per Capita in Current US Dollars 
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<Figure 7> Real GDP per Capita in PPP US Dollars 
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Notes: PPP (OECD) is based upon PPP exchange rate data published by the OECD (www.oecd.org/std/ppp), and 
PPP (Inflation Differentials) is based on the PPP exchange rate calculated from inflation differentials between Korea 
and US. 
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<Figure 8> Cost of Holding International Reserves 
-100
-80
-60
-40
-20
0
20
40
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
real cost of sterilization real interest differentials%
 
 
Notes: Real cost of sterilization is [(1+i)-(1+i*)(1+x)]/(1+π), where i is Monetary Stabilization Bonds yield, i* is T-
Bill rate, x is the depreciation rate of the won/dollar exchange rate, and π is the CPI inflation rate of Korea. Real 
interest differentials are (i-π)-(i*-π*), where π* is the CPI inflation rate of the US.         
Monetary Stabilization Bonds yield reflects the cost of sterilizing the accumulation of international reserves and a 
large portion of international reserves has been invested in T-Bills. Monetary Stabilization Bonds are the central 
bank’s interest-bearing bonds that are directly backed by printing money, unlike government bonds that are 
primarily backed by legal taxation. The Korean monetary authority has actively sterilized a large current account 
surplus and capital inflows by selling the Monetary Stabilization Bonds. In this sterilization process, the Bank of 
Korea incurs the high quasi-fiscal cost associated with purchasing low-yielding foreign assets and selling high-
yielding Monetary Stabilization Bonds.  See Seo (2002). 
